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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-T O R T s-LIABILITY OF CITY FOR IN-
JURIES TO PRISONER ASSAULTED BY FELLOW PRISONER-The plaintiff
alleged that agents of the city who were in charge of the ]ail were
"grossly and wantonly" negligent in confining him with another
prisoner because they knew of the latter's violent nature and mental
instability, and, in failing to seek medical attention for the plaintiff
for a period of one day after he was injured. The Supreme Court
of Kansas held that the municipality was not liable for damages for
the negligence or misconduct of its officers or employees when
acting in the performance of its governmental functions based on
the principle of municipal immunity Parker v City of Hutchinson,
196 Kan. 148, 410 P.2d 347 (1966)
The Kansas Court refused to abrogate the doctrine of municipal
immunity despite its recognition that the trend of judicial decisions
is to restrict, rather than to expand, the doctrine.1 The origin of
the principle of governmental immunity is generally traced to the
English case of Russell v Men of Devon,2 and is based on the
medieval concept of sovereignty whereby it was believed the King
could do no wrong.3 The Russell case was a suit brought against
all of the men of Devon, alleging an injury caused by a county
bridge out of repair The opinion emphasized the fact that the suit
was not based upon a statute, and that there were no precedents
in support of the action. Lord Kenyon also noted that, had this experi-
ment succeeded, it would have produced an infinity of actions.
4
Although the Russell case was founded on questionable legal
grounds,5 and even though it would seem somewhat anomalous
that the principle of governmental immunity would be adopted in
American courts since it was based upon the divine right of kings, 6
the issue has created considerable litigation in this country 7 The
distinction is usually drawn in these cases between "governmental"
and "proprietary" functions,8 but in the present case both sides
concede that the city was engaged in a governmental function in
operating its jail. The plaintiff argued that the time had come for
.1. See Wendler v. City of Great Bend, 181 Kan. 753, 316 P.2d 265 (1957) Krantz
v. City of Hutchlnson, 165 Kan. 449. 196 P.2d 227 (1948)
2. 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
3. See Molitor v. Kaneland Community School Dist. No. 302, 18 ll.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d
89 (1959).
4. See Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
5. The Russell case cites no law In support of the decision, although Lord Kenyon
noted that "[T]here is a precedent against [the action] in Brooke."
6. See Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
7. E.g., Wendler v. City of Great Bend, supra note 1 Holytz v. City of Milwaukee.
supra note 6.
8. Generally, municipal corporations are not liable for negligent 'acts while perform-
ing their political or governmental functions, but they are liable for their negligence while
engaged in private, proprietary, or corporate activities. Wendler v. City of Great Bend,
supra note 1 at 270.
RECENT CASES
Kansas to follow the lead taken by other jurisdictions and abrogate
the doctrine completely The Kansas Court, however, chose to rely
upon stare decisis, together with the pronouncement that this would
be an area for legislative, not judicial, action.9
The first state to abrogate the doctrine of governmental immunity
was Florida, which, in 1957, was presented in Hargrove v Town of
Cocoa Beach0 with a situation strikingly similar to that in the
instant case. In that case, a prisoner, locked in the city jail and
left untended, died of suffocation as the result of a fire. In finding
for the plaintiff, the Florida Court said, "[O]ur own feeling is
that the courts should be alive to the demands of justice. We can
see no necessity for insisting on legislative action in a matter which
the courts themselves originated."' ", Since that decision, the courts
in Illinois,'12 New Jersey, 13  Michigan,1 4  California,15 Wisconsin,"
Minnesota,'1 7 Alaska,"' Arizona, 9 and Kentucky 20 have abrogated
the doctrine.
The Court in Kansas has already abrogated the doctrine of
immunity as it applies to charitable institutions, 2 to church corpora-
tions, 22 to defects in public streets,2 3 and to nuisances maintained
by municipalities.24 But when faced with the factual situation alleged
by the plaintiff, the court determined that it is up to the legislature
to abolish the doctrine in the area under consideration. The Kansas
Court did not deem it necessary to distinguish the earlier immunity
cases nor to indicate any conclusive factors which would reflect
under what circumstances the court might make further exceptions
to the doctrine without legislative action.
The public policy of Kansas, as expressed in that State's
Constitution, is that "All persons, for injuries suffered in person,
9. Parker V. City of Hutchinson, 196 Kan. 148, 410 .2d 347 (1966)
10. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
11. id. at 132.
12. Molitor v. Kaneland Community School Dist. No. 302, 18 Il2d 11, 163 N.E.2d
89 (1959).
13. McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820 (1960) (applies liability only
for "active wrongdoing").
14. Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961).
15. Muskopf v. Cornfg Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961).
16. Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962)
17. Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962).
18. City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201 (Alaska 1962). See also Scheele v.
City of Anchorage, 385 P.2d 582 (Alaska 1963). But see Hale v. City of Anchorage, 389
P.2d 434 (Alaska 1964) (due to the unusual weather conditions in Alaska, that State's
Court has modified its ruling to make municipalities immune from suit for injuries caused
by ice and snow on sidewalks).
19. Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n., 93 Ariz. 384, 831 P.2d 107 (1963).
20. Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964).
21. Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954).
22. McAtee v. St. Paul's Mission, 190 Kan. 518, 376 P.2d 823 (1962).
23. Smith v. Kansas City, 158 Kan. 213, 146 P.2d 660 (1944).
24. Lehmkuhl v. Junction City, 179 Kan. 389, 295 P.2d 621' (1956) , Jeakins v. City
of El Dorado, 143 Kan. 206, 53 P.2d 798 (1936).
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reputation or property, shall have remedy by due course of law,
and justice administered without delay ",25 The policy of govern-
mental immunity, which the court of Kansas chose to uphold, was
stated by a concurring judge in the Russell case to be based on a
general principle of law that "[I]t is better that an individual
should sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an incon-
vemence. ' 2 6 It is curious that any court could follow such totally
inconsistent policies and yet not find it necessary to reconcile them,
particularly in view of the fact that, when this Court considered tort
liability for charitable institutions, it held the above-cited constitu-
tional provision meant that for wrongs recognized by law the court
shall be open and afford a remedy 27 The question remains as to
why it is necessary to consider this public policy issue as it concerns
charitable institutions but not as it concerns municipal corporations.
Notably, there are instances in which the Kansas Legislature
has provided for tort liability of governmental units. 2  These
statutes are construed by this Court as illustrative of an implied
legislative approval of the doctrine of governmental immunity 21
The court fails to consider, however, that legislative inaction
could very well merely indicate that individuals who suffer damages
as a result of governmental immunity represent a minority who have
little lobbying strength in the legislatures. 0 It is ironic that a
person has a remedy if the state takes his property, 31 but he has
no recourse when he is injured by the state's negligence even when,
as in the instant case, he is totally dependent upon the state for
his welfare and protection. It was under circumstances like these
that the Florida Court took the first step to establish the present
trend.3 2 Considering the fact that the doctrine of governmental
immunity was born in the courts, together with its abrogation pre-
viously m Kansas in certain areas and its total abrogation in other
states, the instant case presented an ideal opportunity for this
25. KAN. CONST., Bill of Rights § 18.
26. Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 362 (1788).
27. See Noel v. Menninger Foundation, supra note 21 at 943.
28. KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 68 § 301 (1963) (provides for liability of counties and town-
ships for defective bridges, culverts and highways) KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 74 § 4707 (1963)
(requires all state agencies to purchase motor vehicle liability insurance) KAN. STAT. ANN.
ch. 74 § 4708 (1963) (waives governmental immunity to the extent of the coverage) KAN.
STAT. ANN. ch. 12 § 2602 (1963) (,permits municipalities to purchase motor vehicle liability
and medical payment insurance) KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 12 § 2603 (1963) (waives immunity
to the extent of the amount of insurance obtained by a municipality).
29. See Parker v. City of Hutchinson, 196 Kan. 148, 410 P.2d 347 (1966).
30. For another view regarding the legislative role in this area, see the concurring
opinion in Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618, 626 (1962). This
opinion points out that the reason the legislature might have refused to change the
immunity rule was because the court had adopted the rule, therefore the court must
"face up to the responsibility of changing a court made rule of law.
31. KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 26 § 513(a) (1963).
32. See Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
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Court to take the initiative and break with an archaic, unjust rule.
North Dakota has a constitutional barrier greatly limiting the
scope of the court's power by providing that "suits may be brought
against the state in such manner, in such courts, and in such
cases, as the legislative assembly may, by law, direct. 3 3 Municipal
corporations, as creatures of the state, " are therefore liable only
as established by statute. This is also the rule regarding counties
in North Dakota, 5 but a different rule was established by the court
for charitable institutions, which are no longer immune.3 6 The Legis-
lature has provided for suits against municipal corporations for
injuries arising because of defective streets, sidewalks, and bridges.
3 7
The North Dakota Court considered the governmental immunity
doctrine in a 1965 case,3 8 and, noting that the previous Legislative
Session had recognized the doctrine when it amended and reenacted
a statute concerning the "right to claim governmental immunity"
by political subdivisions which purchase liability insurance,3 9 the
court upheld the doctrine. Therefore, it would appear that if any
relief is to be forthcoming in the State of North Dakota regarding
governmental immunity, such a change will have to be made by
statute or constitutional amendment.
JOHN D. OLSRUD
LIENS-MECHANICS' LIENS-RIGHT TO AND PERFECTION OF LIENS
-Plaintiff brought action to foreclose a mechanics' lien against the
property owners and also a mortgagor and judgment creditor who
claimed first priority on the property Plaintiff's claim to the me-
chanics' lien hinged on whether a certain item delivered was actually
used in construction of the defendant's house and whether plaintiff
had perfected his lien according to statute. The Supreme Court of
Kansas held that the mechanics' lien would not attach because it
was not proven that the item in question was actually used in
construction and thus the statement required to perfect the lien
33. N.D. CONST., § 22.
34. N.D. CONST., § 130. See Fetzer v. Minot Park Dist., 138 N.W.2d 601 (N.D. 1965).
35. Mayer v. Studer & Manion Co., 66 N.D. 190, 262 N.W 925 (1935).
36. Granger v. Deaconess Hosp. of Grand Forks, 138 N.W.2d 443 (N.D. 1965)
Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hosp., 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W.2d 247 (1946).
37. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-42-01 (1960).
38. See Fetzer v. Minot Park Dist., 138 N.W.2d 601 (N.D. 1965).
39. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-43-07 (Supp. 1965). For a discussion of the effect of liability
insurance on governmental immunity, see 39 N.D.L. REv. 358 (1963).
